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TEACHER FACEBOOK SPEECH: PROTECTED OR NOT? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
June Talvitie-Siple, a 54 year-old math teacher, was forced 
to resign when she called her students "germbags" and the 
community "snobby" on her Facebook page with the settings 
unknowingly set "to public." 1 Similarly, in January 2010, high 
school teacher Ginger D'Amico was suspended from her 
teaching job in Pennsylvania because another person posted a 
picture of her with a male stripper at a bachelorette party that 
many of the district's teachers attended.2 The picture was up 
for less than twenty-four hours, and D'Amico requested the 
individual remove the picture as soon as she became aware of 
it, but she nearly lost her job over the incident. 3 
The public often holds teachers to a higher moral and 
ethical standard than the general populace because they are 
mentors, coaches, and examples for the nation's youth. In the 
past, teachers have easily kept their private and public lives 
separate, and generally students and parents did not know 
what their teachers did or said outside of the classroom. 
However, with the explosion of Facebook and other social 
media outlets, teachers, like other private and public 
employees, are finding it more difficult to keep their private 
lives separate from work. Besides using electronic media to 
post homework assignments for school, they post about social 
events, which students and parents can access via networking 
sites. 
1. i\llison Manning, Educators Advised to Be Cautious on Facebook Profile, 
Enuc. WK., Sept. 29, 2010, at 8. 
2. Anya Sostek, ACLU Puts Faces on Violations of Civil Liberties, MCCLATCHY-
TRJB. Bus. NEWS, Oct. 11, 2010, at 11. 
3. Settlement Reached in Teacher's Stripper Photo Suspension, Wl'Xl.COM, Aug. 
17, 2010, http://www.wpxi.com/news/21657376/detail.html (reporting that the teacher 
was originally given a thirty-day suspension, hut the i\CLU threatened to sue on her 
behalf, whereupon the school district reinstated her, gave her back pay, and awarded 
her $10,000). 
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In the last few years, many school districts and states have 
passed policies that limit both teacher-student interaction on 
Facebook and the types of material that teachers can post on 
their personal pages. For example, Louisiana Governor Bobby 
Jindal recently signed legislation that would make teacher-
student interaction on Facebook illegal.4 Other states have 
taken milder approaches, such as the Utah Board of Education 
mandating that every district have its own policy5 on social 
networking, and school districts in Texas focusing on a 
teacher's "professional code of ethics," which encourages a 
social distance between the teacher and student.6 The reasons 
for such policy decisions mostly reflect a need to protect 
students from inappropriate contact with teachers that could 
lead to illegal actions.7 For example, the New York City school 
district recently terminated the employment of three teachers 
for inappropriate communication with their students on 
Facebook.8 
While most people want to protect students, some of the 
school districts' policies regarding teacher use of social media 
may be infringing on teacher free speech rights. School district 
social media policies usually prohibit teachers from befriending 
students, but they also tell teachers what they can or cannot 
post on their web pages. Most district policies ban what the 
public hopes teachers would have the good sense not to post 
anyway-provocative photographs, sexually explicit messages, 
the glorifying of alcohol or drugs, or confidential information. 9 
4. Bob Sullivan Teachers, Students and Facebook, a Toxic Mix, MSNBC RED 
TAPE CHRONS. BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010, 10:00 a.m.), http://redtape.msnbc.msn.com/ 
news/20 10/1 0/22/6:i1553 7-teachers-students-and-face book -a- toxic-mix. 
5. Katie Ash, Policies Target Teacher-Student Cyber Talk, Enuc. WK., Nov. 4, 
2009, at 1. 
6. ld. 
7. ld. 
8. Perry Chiaramonte & Yoav Gonen, Teachers Fired for Flirting on Facebook 
with Students, N.Y. POST, Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/p/news/locallteachers_ 
friending_spree_JVfE08TmN7XCnWpX5s5hnO. Bronx teacher Chadwin Reynolds 
befriended female students and wrote things like "this is sexy" under the girl's pictures 
as well as obtaining a female student's phone number and sending her flowers and a 
teddy bear. Id. Manhattan teacher Stephen D'Andrilli sent messages to female 
students telling them they were pretty, and Long Island City teacher, Laurie Hirsch, 
was fired for posting a picture of her kissing an 18-year-old male former student on the 
lips-and it was later revealed that they had had a sexual relationship for over a year. 
!d. 
9. Laurie Welch, Idaho School District Developing Policy Umiting Teacher 
Online Interaction with Students, MAGIC VALLEY TIMES-NEWS, Oct. 20, 2010, 
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However, how far can a school district go in regulating a 
teacher's comments about his off-the-job legal conduct? The 
Massachusetts Association of School Committees recently 
passed a policy that stresses the "importance of maintaining 
proper decorum in the online, digital world," and which 
encourages 10 superintendents to "periodically conduct internet 
searches to see if teachers have posted inappropriate materials 
online." 11 
While parents and communities may want their students' 
teachers to set a high example, teachers are average people 
that go to parties (sometimes where alcohol is served) and rant 
out their frustrations of work or school to their friends 
(occasionally in unpleasant terms). Facebook can make private 
conversations or social gatherings public-sometimes because 
of lapse of judgment on the teacher's part, and sometimes 
involuntarily or unwittingly, as in the cases of June Talvitie-
Siple and Ginger D'Amico above. Like the rest of the users on 
Facebook, teachers unquestionably engage in speech when they 
post pictures or comments. The federal circuit courts vary as to 
which doctrine to apply concerning teacher speech rights. 12 
Half the circuits have applied a Pickering-Connick-Garcetti 
public employee model to teachers, while the other half has 
applied the student-oriented Hazelwood approach. Case law 
regulating teacher speech should give teachers the maximum 
freedom of expression possible, while still protecting students 
from potentially inappropriate teacher-student interaction. 
Teacher internet speech creates unique problems not seen 
elsewhere, but both approaches likely would permit a school 
district to prohibit their teachers from interacting with 
students via social networking. Therefore, while both speech 
models permit school districts to protect students, the 
Hazelwood model gives teachers the most liberal free speech 
rights in other areas of teacher internet speech. 
h ttp:l /www. magicvalley .com/news/local/mini -cassia/ article_f50d:351 e-53 7 4- 5b32-903b-
ee92eh6:Hca6.html. 
10. Peter Schworm, Teachers Warned Not to "Friend" Students, Bos. GLOBE, OCT. 
25, 2010, at B1. 
11. ld. 
12. See infra section 11-C. 
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II. APPROACHES TO TEACHER SPEECH 
A. Pickering-Connick-Garcetti Public Official Model 
The First Amendment protects a public official's speech if 
she speaks 1) as a citizen, 2) on a matter of public concern, and 
3) not pursuant to her "official duties." The public official 
model, as applied to teacher free speech outside of the 
classroom, balances the interests of the school board as a public 
employer and the rights of the teacher to speak as a citizen on 
matters of public concern. In Pickering u. Board of Education, 
an Illinois school board dismissed Marvin Pickering, a high 
school teacher, after he sent a letter to the editor that criticized 
the board's handling of past tax revenues raised through bond 
elections. 13 The board allegedly dismissed the teacher because 
the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and 
administration of the schools," 14 contained false information 
that "impugned" the reputation of the board and 
administration, was "disruptive of faculty discipline," and 
"foment[ed] controversy, conflict and dissension among the 
education staff." 15 
The United States Supreme Court held that teacher speech 
on matters of public concern, which is not knowingly false and 
not directed at persons where personal loyalty is needed, could 
not be subjected to dismissal even when the speech is critical of 
school authorities. 16 The Court weighed the interest of the 
teacher in speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern 
and the interest of the state as an employer to maintain 
harmony and discipline in the workplace. 17 Factors in the 
Pickering balancing test include whether the speech interferes 
with 1) the employee's "daily duties in the classroom," 18 2) the 
"regular operation of the schools generally," 19 3) the working 
relationship between the speaker and the person or institution 
at whom the criticism is directed.20 The public interest of free 
debate outweighs the interest of the school or board as an 
13. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
14. ld. at 564. 
15. ld. at 567. 
16. ld. at 569-70. 
17. ld. at 573. 
18. Id. at 572. 
19. !d. 
20. ld. at 570. 
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employer, unless the teacher speaks in "reckless disregard"21 of 
the truth, creates disharmonious relations in the workplace, 
undermines the immediate supervisor's discipline over the 
employee, or compromises the loyalty and confidence required 
of close working employees. 22 The Pickering Court decided for 
the teacher because the letter contained general criticisms of 
board decisions, did not particularly name individuals, and the 
teacher's responsibilities did not require that he maintain close 
relationships with board members.23 Citizens often speak 
through letters to the editor about school board decisions 
regarding expenditure of public funds, and thus the issue was a 
matter of public concern.24 Public officials often are in the best 
position to inform the debate, and therefore First Amendment 
policy should encourage their participation. However, teachers 
may not reveal confidential information.25 
In 1983, the Supreme Court added another key piece to the 
public official doctrine in Connick v. Meyers, holding that 
employee speech on matters of internal employment issues or 
personal interests are not matters of public concern nor is the 
person speaking as a citizen and the speech is therefore, 
unprotected. 26 In Connick, Meyers, a former assistant district 
attorney in New Orleans, voiced her opposition of her upcoming 
transfer to her supervisors and distributed a questionnaire 
among her co-workers that requested their responses regarding 
office policies such as transfers, grievance processes, and 
confidence in superiors.27 The district attorney's office 
thereafter dismissed her for refusing to accept the transfer and 
for insubordination in the form of the questionnaire, but 
Meyers alleged that the district attorney's office fired her for 
exercising her free speech rights.28 According to the Pickering 
analysis, the Court weighed the interests of the employee to 
speak on matters of public concern and the interests of the 
state, as an employer, to promote efficiency in the workplace.29 
21. ld. at 573. 
22. /d. at 570. 
2:3. !d. at 569-70. 
21. /d. at 571. 
25. Id. at 572. 
26. Connick v. Myers,161 U.S. 1:38 (1988). 
27. !d. at 111. 
28. Id. 
29. !d. at 116. 
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The Court held that Meyers did not speak as a citizen on a 
matter of public concern but as an employee on a matter of 
personal interest regarding internal employment procedures, 
and therefore her speech was unprotected because the Court 
did not want to get involved in internal personnel decisions.30 
The Court especially emphasized that the content, form, and 
context of speech are factors to consider in deciding if the 
speech is a matter of public concern. 31 However, the Connick 
Court dictated that personal matters discussed privately were 
not necessarily "totally beyond" First Amendment protection.32 
The dissent in Connick argued that private speech did not 
make it less of a public concern, and the questionnaire was a 
public issue because it dealt with how the district attorney was 
performing his duties as an elected official. 33 The majority 
responded that Myers did not make her complaints about the 
district attorney public, and even if she had, the questionnaire 
would not have revealed important public information, but 
rather only displayed mere grievances that one employee had 
about the "status quo."34 
Later the Supreme Court affirmatively held in Givhan v. 
Western Line Consolidated School District that employee 
speech directed at a supervisor, rather than the public, does 
not necessarily lose First Amendment protection, but a 
Pickering balancing approach is used as the speech is 
evaluated in its content, form, and context as stated in 
Connick. 35 In Givhan, a public school teacher discussed with 
her immediate supervisor her dissatisfaction with the district's 
achievements in desegregation.36 The court ruled that the 
content of speech, desegregation, was a matter of public 
concern and the teacher was speaking as a citizen, even though 
it was to her immediate supervisor. 37 
The Supreme Court gave a broad reading to a "matter of 
public concern" in Rankin v. McPherson when it held that a 
private conversation between co-workers was protected when a 
30. Id. at 154. 
31. !d. at 147-18. 
32. !d. at 147. 
33. ld. at 163. 
34. !d. at 148. 
35. Givhan v. W. Line Canso!. Sch. Dist., 1il9 U.S.110 (1979). 
36. !d. at 412-13. 
37. !d. at 115-16. 
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clerical worker in a county constable's office wished that if 
another assassination were attempted on then-President 
Ronald Reagan's life, it would be successful. 38 The Court held 
that a discussion of Ronald Reagan's policies was a matter of 
public concern, and given the content and context of the speech, 
the employer's interest in an efficient workplace did not 
outweigh the employee's right to speak.39 The Court applied 
the Pickering balancing approach between the employer and 
employee, but reasoned that the speech was entirely private, 
did not disrupt the workplace, or interfere with working 
relationships in the office. Specifically, the employee was not in 
a public or policymaking position.40 
The Supreme Court added the last and sometimes 
controversial piece (as applied to teachers and college 
professors) in Garcetti v. Celballos41 in holding that an 
employee does not speak as a citizen when he is acting 
"pursuant to his official duties."42 Garcetti involved a deputy 
public prosecutor who recommended dismissal of a case 
because of government misconduct.43 According to the Court, 
managerial discretion took precedent over judicial supervision, 
and since the deputy prosecutor was acting pursuant to his 
official duties, he was acting as an employee rather than a 
citizen and the public official free speech doctrine did not 
protect him.44 In his dissent, Justice Souter argued that the 
new "official duties" step would "imperil First Amendment 
protection of academic freedom in public colleges and 
universities, whose teachers necessarily speak and write 
'pursuant to official duties."'45 The Court declined to define 
"official duties" in Garcetti,46 but the majority responded to 
Justice Souter's concern by declining to determine whether the 
holding applied to "scholarship or teaching" because of the 
"additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted 
38. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383-81, 381 (1987). 
39. !d. at 386-87. 
10. /d. at 389. 
11. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 517 U.S.110 (2006). 
42. Id. at 121. 
43. Jd. at 111-15. 
11. /d. at 122-23 
45. !d. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
46. /d. at 123 (majority opinion). 
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for by [the] Court's customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence."47 
To prove an unlawful censorship of speech according to a 
public official doctrine, the employee must first carry the 
burden that the First Amendment protects his or her speech. 
Next, the employee must show that the protected speech was a 
motivating factor for the government in executing the dismissal 
or disciplinary action.48 However, the court will give the 
government employer an opportunity to rebut by showing by a 
preponderance of evidence that it would have reached same 
employment decision even if the protected speech were 
absent.49 In Mount Healthy City School District u. Doyle, a 
teacher's contract was not renewed after he called into a local 
radio station complaining about a newly instituted teachers' 
dress code. 50 The Supreme Court held that while the radio 
speech was protected and that is was a substantial motivating 
factor in the decision not to rehire the teacher, the district 
court should have decided whether the school district would 
have made the same decision even if the teacher had not 
expressed the protected speech. 51 The Court did not wish to 
protect an employee who engaged in previous unprofessional 
conduct worthy of dismissal just because he made one 
constitutionally protected comment in a bid for reinstatement 
based on a free speech claim. 52 The school district in Mount 
Healthy alleged that it dismissed the teacher for the 
unprofessional conduct of engaging in a public altercation with 
another teacher and directing vulgar hand gestures at female 
students. 53 
Perry u. Sindermann is an important aspect of the public 
official doctrine in education cases because the Supreme Court 
held that the government could not deny a benefit to an 
employee based on his constitutionally protected speech even if 
the employee is non-tenured and has no contractual right to 
the benefit.54 In Perry, a junior college chose not to renew a 
47. Id. at 125. 
48. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 271,287 (1977). 
49. I d. at 285-86. 
50. Id. at 271. 
51. Id. at 285-86. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 274. 
54. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 59il (1972). 
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non-tenured professor's contract because of his criticism of the 
governing board's policies.55 Even though the contract was at-
will, the university had to give the professor due process and 
could not dismiss the professor only for his constitutionally 
protected speech. 56 
1. What is a matter of "public concern"? 
The courts have not precisely defined a matter of "public 
concern," but the Supreme Court has directed that the form, 
context, and manner of the speech should be considered. The 
Third Circuit said in Borden v. School District of the Township 
of East Brunswick, "the content of speech on a matter of public 
concern generally addresses a social or political concern of the 
community,"57 and the Supreme Court has said, "speech on 
matters of purely private concern is of less First Amendment 
concern" because "there is no threat to the free and robust 
debate of public issues; there is no potential interference with a 
meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-government; and 
there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-
censorship by the press."58 The Second Circuit has held, 
"speech on a purely private matter, such as an employee's 
dissatisfaction with the conditions of his employment, does not 
pertain to a matter of public concern."59 
An issue is a matter of public concern in education if it is 
"speech by a public school employee about a policy or practice 
which can substantially and detrimentally affect the welfare of 
the children attending the school."60 Other examples of matters 
of public concern in the school setting include speaking about 
the use of corporal punishment during a public debate,61 
student violence against teachers, 62 discussion of team hazing 
55. Id. at 595. 
56. ld. at 597. 
57. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of the Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 169~70 (3d 
Cir. 2008). 
58. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759~60 
(1985). 
59. Lewis v. Cowen, 165 F.3d 151, 163~64 (2d Cir. 1999). 
60. Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 906 F.2d 1134, 1437~38 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
61. Rankin v. lndep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-3, Noble Cnty., Okla., 876 F.2d 838, 843 
(1Oth Cir. 1989). 
62. Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y.C., 423 F. Supp. 2d ::38, 50~52 (KD. N.Y. 
2006). 
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by an athletic director,63 speech about violations of Title IX,64 a 
letter to the newspaper about sexual discrimination/)5 and 
opposition to war on a MySpace account. 66 Examples of speech 
that has not been protected in an education setting include 
speaking on the use of caffeine to enhance athletics,67 large 
class sizes,68 and criticizing supervisors.69 
The courts have made it clear that the school board has the 
authority to set the curriculum and that it can discipline a 
teacher for failing to follow the proscribed curriculum.70 
However, two recent circuit court cases have emphasized that a 
teacher speaks "pursuant to her official duties" when she 
speaks in the classroom, meaning that such speech fails the 
Garcetti prong of the Pickering analysis and is not a matter of 
public concern and thus unprotected by the First 
Amendment. 7 I 
2. Summary of public official free speech doctrine 
The First Amendment protects a public official's speech if 
she speaks 1) as a citizen, 2) on a matter of public concern, 3) 
and not pursuant to her "official duties.'m While courts have 
not specifically defined "public concern," political or social 
63. Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 114 F.i~d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 
2006). 
61. Samuelson v. LaPorte Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 3:05-CV-99RM, 2006 WL 
3365774 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 17, 2006). 
65. Seemuller v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 878 F.2d 1578 (1th Cir. 1989). 
66. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, :110-11 (D. Conn. 2008). 
67. Schul v. Sherard, 102 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Ohio 2000). 
68. Cliff v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs of Indianapolis, Ind., 12 F.:ld 40il, 109 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
69. Saia v. Haddonfield Area Sch. Dist., No. 05-2876, 2007 WL 2691182 (D. N.J. 
Sept. 10, 2007). 
70. Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 197il)) (noting that academic freedom does 
not permit teachers to "choos[e] their own curriculum or classroom management 
techniques in contravention of school-policy or dictates"); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that secondary school teachers do 
not have academic freedom and thus do not have "control of public school curricula"); 
Palmer v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 603 F.2d 1271, 1273 (7th Cir. 1979) ("First Amendment 
[is] not a teacher's license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established 
curricular content"). 
71. Evans-Marshall v. Bd of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 624 
F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010); Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
72. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. 
High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
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Issues of the community73 are more likely to be matters of 
public concern than internal employment grievances;74 
however, courts will look at the time, content, form, and 
context of the speech, 75 and employee speech to supervisors is 
not necessarily unprotected.76 Finally, it is the employee's 
burden to prove that the disputed speech was protected and a 
motivating factor in the government employer's adverse 
employment decision, which the government can rebut by 
showing it would have made the same decision even if the 
protected speech were absent. 77 
While the public official free speech doctrine seems usable 
in off-the-job teacher speech via the internet, it would not be 
very protective of personal posts and comments in an online 
social environment because most posts would not be a matter of 
public concern, although the posts could demonstrate behavior 
or communicate in ways that are legal. 
B. Tinker-Hazelwood Student Speech Model 
Other circuit courts use the Tinker-Hazelwood student free 
speech model to determine if teacher speech is protected. In 
Tinker v. Des Moines, principals from the town's high school 
and middle school heard of an anti-Vietnam group's plan to 
wear armbands in opposition to the war, and the principals 
banned the armbands. 78 Three students wore black armbands 
with peace signs to school and the principals suspended the 
students for violating the ban.79 The Supreme Court held that 
to censor speech a school must show that it based the 
regulation on "more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort 
and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular 
viewpoint."80 The school can only censor the speech when it 
would "materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
7il. Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.ild 153 (2008). 
7-1. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 1il8, 1-19 (1988). 
75. ld. 
76. Givhan v. W. Line Consul. Sch. Dist., -1:39 U.S. 410 (1979). 
77. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 
78. Tinker v. Des Moines, a9::l U.S. 508, 504 (1969). 
79. !d. 
80. ld. at 509. 
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school." The Court held that the armbands did not pose such a 
disruption. 81 
The Supreme Court added to the Tinker doctrine in 
Hazelwood v. Kulmeier in holding that a school can regulate 
speech that students, parents, or the public might reasonably 
perceive to bear the "imprimatur of the school"82 if the 
censorship is related to a "legitimate pedagogical concern"83 
and if the location of the speech is not a traditional public 
forum. 84 The Hazelwood Court held that a principal could 
delete articles from a school newspaper because the newspaper 
bore the "imprimatur of the school," was not a traditional 
public forum, and because protecting student identities and 
ensuring age-appropriate material was a "legitimate 
pedagogical concern."85 
The Supreme Court ruled in Bethel v. Fraser that a school 
could discipline a high school student for delivering a speech 
that contained sexual innuendo to an assembly of his fellow 
students.86 The Court emphasized the students were a captive 
audience and that it is a school's responsibility to teach civil 
discourse. 87 Additionally, it is the school board's privilege and 
responsibility to set and ensure age-appropriate material 
curriculum, 88 and unlike Tinker, the Bethel school board did 
not censure the speech based on viewpoint. 89 
A student in Morse v. Fredricksberg held up a sign during a 
school-sponsored parade that said "Bong hits for Jesus," which 
the school saw purely as a drug reference, with the student 
attempting to make his speech a hybrid case with religion. 90 
The Supreme Court called the student's bluff and ruled that his 
speech did not concern a sincerely held belief and therefore the 
school could discipline the student for the speech because it 
was "reasonably regarded as encouraging illegal drug use."91 
81. Id. 
82. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
83. I d. at 27:i. 
84. Id. at 267. 
85. Id. at 271. 
86. Bethel v. Fraser, 4 78 U.S. 675 (1986). 
87. Id. 
88. ld. at 68:?. 
89. !d. at 680. 
90. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 39il (20ll7). 
91. ld. 
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At least one court has used a Tinker-Hazelwood-like 
approach to teacher internet speech.92 A modified Tinker-
Hazelwood approach can be used to regulate teacher internet 
speech that both protects students and provides a speech 
protective internet environment for teachers. Particularly, the 
prongs that analyze whether the speech is a substantial 
interruption to school operations and if a legitimate 
pedagogical concern justifies regulation are useful in the 
teacher internet speech analysis. Using this model, teachers 
could be prohibited from interacting with students online 
because it likely would cause a substantial interruption of the 
learning environment and the districts would thus have a 
pedagogical reason to limit it. Other teacher internet speech 
like personal posts and comments would be protected under the 
Tinker-Hazelwood model because they likely would not be a 
substantial interruption of the work environment, particularly 
if students are prohibited from accessing teacher websites. 
Admittedly, the prongs that ask whether the speech bears the 
"imprimatur of the school" and whether the forum is public are 
a little more difficult in the teacher internet speech world. On 
one hand, teachers speaking to students in whatever context 
could possibly bear the "imprimatur of the school" and could be 
used to curb such speech. However, social network sites likely 
would be considered public forums where administrators would 
not have as much room to regulate teacher speech. 
Nevertheless, a modified use of the Tinker-Hazelwood approach 
using the first two questions discussed above would be useful to 
protect students and protect teacher speech. 
C. Circuit Court Applications of the Pickering and Hazelwood 
Models 
The Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply 
the public official model to teacher speech.93 Among those 
districts, the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have 
specifically applied the Garcetti "official duties" test, arguing 
that the possible exception that the Supreme Court carved out 
for "scholarship and teaching" applied to universities and 
92. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008). See infra section 
III, which discusses the case in detail. 
9:3. See generally Kimberly Lee, Establishing a Constitutional Standard that 
Protects Public School Teacher Classroom Hxpression, :38 J.L. & EDUC. 409 (2009). 
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academic freedom and was not applicable in public secondary 
schools.94 In two recent cases, the application of Garcetti was 
the determining factor against two teacher free-speech claims. 
In Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education, decided in 2010, the 
Sixth Circuit found that a teacher's selection of a book list for 
her high school English students was an action pursuant to her 
official duties and thus not protected speech.95 Evans-Marshall 
was teaching a unit on government censorship and provided a 
list of books to her students that had commonly been censored 
in the past. 96 After choosing a book from the list, the students 
created a project that addressed why their particular book may 
have been challenged.97 Although the court found that the 
teacher was speaking as a citizen and that government 
censorship was a matter of public concern, she was also 
teaching pursuant to her official duties and so the school 
district could choose not to renew her contract. 98 The Seventh 
Circuit ruled similarly in 2007, in Mayer v. Monroe County 
Community School Corporation, that a school district could 
terminate the employment of an elementary teacher who 
implied her opposition to the Iraq war during class time as part 
of a lesson on civic involvement. 99 The teacher was acting 
pursuant to her official duties when she was in the classroom 
and "teachers hire out their own speech and must provide the 
service for which employers are willing to pay."100 
Piver v. Pender County Board of Education is a Fourth 
Circuit case where the teacher survived the public official free 
speech doctrine. 101 The teacher defended a beleaguered school 
principal, and the school district subsequently notified the 
teacher that it had reassigned him to a school forty minutes 
from his home. 102 When the district eventually fired the 
principal, it also forced the teacher to sign a statement of 
support for the new principal, before they would reassign the 
94. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist., 624 
F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010); Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009); Mayer v. 
Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 471 F.3d 177 (7th Cir. 20ll7). 
95. Evans-Marshall, 624 F.3d 3il2. 
96. !d. at 331-35. 
97. !d. at 335. 
98. Jd. at 312. 
99. 474 F.3d at 179. 
100. /d. 
101. Piver v. Pender Cnty. Ed. of ~;due., 8:35 F.2d 1076 (1th Cir. 1987). 
102. ld. at 1077. 
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teacher to his original school. 103 However, the teacher 
nonetheless filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, alleging that the 
adverse employment action was the result of his 
constitutionally protected First Amendment free speech 
rights. 104 The court agreed that Piver spoke as a citizen at a 
public meeting on a matter of public concern, and that teachers 
should be able to contribute to such debates because they are 
among the people who are best situated to know the issues. 105 
The First, Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have used a 
Hazelwood student speech model to decide whether schools can 
regulate teacher speech. 106 Under the student-speech model, 
the school can regulate the speech if it bears the "imprimatur 
of the school," will "substantially interfere . . . with the 
operations of the school," 107 and the regulation has a 
reasonable relationship to a "legitimate pedagogical 
concern." 10x In Conward v. Cambridge, a teacher picked up 
from the floor a student paper that had written on it 
"Application for a Piece of Ass," and gave it to another student 
as an example of inappropriate language. 109 The First Circuit 
held that the school district could legally discipline the teacher 
because "keeping scatological documents away from 
impressionable youngsters IS certainly a reasonable 
1oa. Id. 
104. /d. 
105. /d. at 1080. Examples of other lower court decisions that have applied a 
Pickering approach to teacher speech include: Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.ad 179 (ad Cir. 
2009) (holding that a professor at a public university was not protected because his 
speech defending a student-athlete and rescinding an invitation to the university 
president were clearly not "related to scholarship or teaching"); Borden v. Sch. Dist. of 
Twp. of E. Brunswick, 52a F. ad 15a (ad Cir. 2008) (holding high school football coach's 
participation in student-initiated prayer was not protected speech because he did not 
speak as a citiwn and it was not a matter of public concern); Lee v. York Cnty. Sch. 
Div., 484 F.3d 687, 695 (4th Cir. 2007) (declining to apply Garcetti hut ruling that 
religious posters on a classroom bulletin hoard were curricular and thus not protected); 
Boring v. Buncombe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 1a6 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding 
teacher's firing after she produced a school play that involved homosexual themes, even 
though speech was outside of classroom and teacher had principal's approval, because 
the play was still curricular and thus she was not speaking as a citizen); Bradley v. 
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172 (ad Cir. 1990) (holding that teaching 
methodology is curricular and thus not a matter of public concern); Kirkland v. 
Northside lndep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 799 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that teacher 
speech in the form of a hook list is not a matter of public concern and thus 
unprotected). 
106. See uenerally Lee, supra note 93. 
107. Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 50:-l, 509 (1969). 
108. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271, 273 (1988). 
109. Con ward v. Cambridge Sch., 171 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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educational objective." 110 In 1991, the Tenth Circuit upheld a 
school district's dismissal of a teacher for commenting in class 
concerning a school rumor about certain students' romantic 
involvement. 111 The court ruled that according to Hazelwood, 
the comments were a substantial disruption and the district 
had a reasonable pedagogical reason to dismiss the teacher. 112 
Ill. ISSUES OF TEACHER INTERNET SPEECH 
Regulating teacher internet speech raises concerns not 
generally seen in other teacher speech cases because internet 
speech usually takes place during non-working hours at the 
teachers' own homes. It is therefore off-the-job speech or 
activity and any regulation of it appears to be big-brotherly. 
For example, as mentioned above, the Massachusetts 
Association of School Committees has encouraged its 
superintendents to search teacher websites periodically to see 
if there is any inappropriate material posted. 113 In the past 
teachers might have commented in person to each other, their 
friends, or neighbors that they disapproved of certain school 
policies, disliked their students, or that they went out and got 
drunk the previous night, and because those conversations 
remained private, teachers did not suffer adverse employment 
actions. However, with the advent of Facebook, MySpace, blogs, 
and other social media, teachers can post the same information 
and feelings that formerly they privately expressed-to such a 
large group of family, friends, and acquaintances, that the 
electronic posts could almost be regarded as letters-to-the 
editor, which was the medium of speech that Pickering 
originally addressed. 
110. Id. at 22. 
111. Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 914 F.2d 773, 774-77 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
112. Id. Examples of lower court decisions that have applied a Hazelwood 
approach to teacher free speech include: Lacks v. Ferguson, 151 F.3d 901 (8th Cir. 
1998) (holding dismissal of teacher who allowed students to use profanity in the 
classroom was legitimately related to a pedagogical concern); Silano v. Sag Harbor 
Union Free Sch. !Jist. Bd. of Educ., 12 F.:id 719, 723-21 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding guest 
speaker could be banned from campus for showing two pictures of women who were 
naked waist up as part of his slideshow); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 45:i (1st Cir. 
1993) (holding dismissal of teacher for discussing abortion of down syndrome fetuses 
was reasonably related to a pedagogical concern). 
113. Schwarm, supra note 10. 
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Facebook has been widespread among college campuses 
since 2005 114-meaning that plenty of young teachers have 
used Facebook for many years and consider it part of their 
daily activities and speech. Young teachers may also not have 
figured out yet how to separate their college partying days from 
their professional lives. 115 Facebook has been open to the 
general public since September 2006, and has more than 750 
million active users, 116 with plenty of older teachers joining in 
recent years who may not be as familiar with the privacy 
settings. 117 Facebook encourages its users to describe their 
personal lives and their feelings, but when teachers make off-
hand remarks about their school, students, or principal, they 
can get in trouble. 
The public expects its teachers to be in-school role models 
for students and to maintain professional boundaries between 
teachers and students. No one would question the dismissal of 
the three New York teachers who were fired last summer for 
inappropriate contact with students through Facebook that 
later led to illegal relationships. 118 Bill Shaw, a professor of law 
and ethics in business said about teacher internet speech, 
"school teachers are supposed to be mature enough not to 
titillate their students .... A teacher is more or less expected 
to be a guide or. . . demonstrably mature." 119 Teachers' 
personal behavior as well as their judgment regarding what to 
make public online or through other avenues are clearly 
grounds for disciplinary action. 120 It is when teachers suffer 
adverse employment decisions from innocent posts or 
comments to their family and friends that the majority of free 
speech rights seem to arise, or when another person posts an 
inappropriate message or picture of the teacher without his or 
her knowledge, such as in the D'Amico case above. As Randy 
Turner, President of the Delaware City Teachers Association 
said, "there is a higher standard [for teachers] ... but I don't 
111. Timeline, FACEBOOK.COM, http://www.facehook.com/press/info.php?statistics 
#!/press/info.php'ltimeline (last visited July 5, 2011). 
115. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
116. Statistics, FAc~:BOOK.COM, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics 
(last visited July 5, 2011). 
117. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
118. Chiaramonte & Gonen, supra note 8. 
119. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
120. ld. 
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think that means that teachers aren't normal people that do 
everything everybody else does." 121 Jeffrey Chambers, a 
spokesman for Ohio Schools Boards Association, said in 
Education Week, "Anywhere [teachers] go, any time of the day, 
they almost have to be on their best behavior." 122 
IV. CASE LAW ON TEACHER INTERNET SPEECH 
This is an emerging area of the law, and while there is a lot 
of case law on teacher in-school speech, there is very little off-
the-job teacher speech or teacher internet speech, partly 
because these cases tend to settle out of court. However, in 
Spanierman v. Hughes, in the federal trial court of the District 
of Connecticut, the court upheld the dismissal of a high school 
teacher for the teacher's MySpace pages, which the court held 
contained inappropriate speech that was not a matter of public 
concern. 123 A fellow teacher discovered Mr. Spanierman's 
MySpace account and found that he was engaging in "peer-to-
peer" conversation with his students. 124 Additionally, the 
administration found pictures of students with pictures of 
naked men nearby and "inappropriate comments underneath 
them." 125 The school administration spoke to Mr. Spanierman 
about the inappropriateness of the content of his page and the 
inappropriateness of engaging on-line with students, and Mr. 
Spanierman deactivated his original MySpace page. 126 
However, a few months later he created a new page with a 
different profile name, but practically the same information. 127 
At the end of the year, the school board decided not to renew 
Mr. Spanierman's contract and he brought suit. 12R 
Mr. Spanierman alleged that he was dismissed because of a 
poem that he posted on his MySpace page that opposed the 
Iraq war. 129 The district court held that the poem was 
protected speech, but that Mr. Spanierman could not show a 
121. Manning, supra note 1. 
122. Jd. 
12icl. Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008). 




128. !d. at 299. 
129. !d. at ill 0. 
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connection between the protected speech and his dismissal. 130 
Rather, the school board decided not to renew Mr. 
Spaniermann's contract because of his unprofessional 
communication with students that the court found could be 
disruptive in the school-particularly when the Mr. 
Spaniermann commented on his students' romantic lives. 131 
Such speech was not a matter of public concern and thus not 
protected and the school had the discretion to execute its 
employment decisions. Thus, at least one district has applied a 
Tinker-Hazelwood-like approach in dismissing a teacher for 
online speech with a student because it was disruptive of the 
learning environment. 
In Snyder v. Millersville University, the university refused 
to award a student teacher her education degree because the 
cooperating school where she performed her student-teaching 
coursework dismissed her for reasons that stemmed from her 
use of social media websites. 132 Millersville University 
informed their student teachers in a training meeting that they 
would be expected to "maintain the same professional 
standards expected of the teaching employees of the 
cooperating school." 133 During the course of the semester, the 
student teacher, Snyder, received less than favorable 
evaluations from her cooperating teacher, Mrs. Reinking, 
particularly concerning inappropriate and peer-like 
conversations with the students. 134 Mrs. Reinking, advised the 
student teacher not to discuss her MySpace account with her 
students, but Snyder allowed several students access to her 
page. 135 Another teacher from the cooperating school found on 
Snyder's page a remark that she would not be applying for 
employment at the cooperating school because of an individual 
who was a "certain problem." 136 Mrs. Reinking felt that the 
remark was directed at her and that it showed Snyder's 
insubordination. 137 The school also objected to a photo of 
1 i10. /d. at illl. 
l::ll. !d. at :312. 
1i12. Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 509:3140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. :3, 
2008). 
1 i1i1. !d. at *i1. 
1 i31. !d. at *1. 
1:35. I d. at *5. 
1:36. Jd. 
1:37. Jd. at *6. 
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Snyder wearing a pirate hat and holding a plastic cup with a 
caption that read, "drunken pirate." 138 The school refused to let 
Snyder finish her student-teaching experience; consequently, 
she failed her student-teaching credits and the university 
denied her an education diploma. 139 
Although Snyder was a student-teacher, the district court 
treated the case as if she had been a teacher because she was 
expected to maintain all the standards of a paid teacher. 140 
Snyder argued that dismissing her for her drunken pirate 
picture and the remarks she made about her school were a 
violation of her free speech. The district court applied the 
Pickering-Connick public official test, and held that the 
drunken-pirate photo and the comments Snyder implied about 
her cooperating teacher were not a matter of public concern 
and therefore not protected. 141 The school district's interests at 
maintaining employment harmony thus outweighed Snyder's 
interests to speak to her students online, make a possibly 
disparaging comment about her supervisor, and display photos 
of the previous night's party. 142 The court never held whether 
one of Snyder's online transgressions alone would have been 
sufficient for the school to dismiss her. However, presumably 
none of the speech-whether with students, about her 
supervisor, or about the alcoholic party-was protected as a 
matter of public concern. At least in this setting, the Pickering-
Connick doctrine does not seem speech protective for 
teachers-even when they comment about legal activity or only 
imply criticism of a supervisor. 
V. APPLICATION OF THE TWO MODELS TO TEACHER INTERNET 
SPEECH 
There are basically four types of internet speech that could 
put at risk a teacher's relationship with his or her school 
district: 1) befriending students on social media sites and 
communicating inappropriately with them, 2) criticizing the 
district, school, students, parents, or the community online, 3) 
posting what school districts may deem as inappropriate photos 
138. I d. 
139. !d. at *8-*9. 
140. ld. at *15. 
141. /d. at *16. 
142. !d. 
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or comments (usually things that are sexually explicit or that 
promote alcohol or drug use, and 4) commenting on political or 
social issues. 
A. Public Official Doctrine 
First, it is unlikely that teacher internet speech would 
conflict with the Garcetti "official duties" prong of the test. 
Most of the internet speech at issue is off-the job on-line 
socializing that teachers engage in from their own homes. 
Hypothetically, a teacher could be acting "pursuant to official 
duties" as she communicated electronically in advising 
students concerning school matters, and in which case her 
speech would not be protected according to the Garcetti 
approach. However, most of the cases likely will not have to 
deal with the Garcetti problem, which overall makes the 
analysis much easier. 
1. Comments on political or social issues 
Comments regarding political or social issues likely would 
be the easiest cases under the public official doctrine. If a 
teacher were to comment about a war, a public school-district 
issue, or perhaps about issues that face teenagers generally-
then presumably he would pass the citizen/public concern test 
that Pickering mandates. The Third Circuit has held that 
speech on political or social issues is a matter of public concern, 
and thus the balance would likely be in favor of the teacher to 
add his voice to public debate. The school would have difficulty 
showing that its interest in employment efficiency should 
overcome core political speech. 
2. Teacher online criticism of the school, faculty, students, or 
community 
Teacher use of social media to criticize the school, faculty, 
students, or community likely would be a more common and 
difficult case for the courts if the speech disrupts the 
employment environment. For example, a Florida teacher was 
fired for saying that he "hated" his students and his school. 143 
While teachers likely often use such speech when talking with 
H:i. Christopher O'Donnel, Union Battles Website Rules, SARASOTA HERALD TRTB., 
Oct. 24, 2010, at B1. 
658 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2011 
one another, similar speech on the internet is public and 
creates permanent evidence, creating more potential for 
liability and greater possibility that the school community will 
learn of the teacher's negative opinion. The above case as well 
as the Talvitie-Siple case (teacher called town snobby) would 
likely fail the public-official balancing analysis because the 
courts would hold that derogatory statements regarding the 
school community is not a matter of public concern and that 
the school has the greater interest to ensure harmony in its 
workplace and professional relationships among teachers and 
students. The teacher speech above is likely more akin to the 
Connick personal grievance or personal speech than the 
Pickering public debate speech. 144 The Second Circuit held, 
"expressing dissatisfaction with working conditions is not, by 
itself, speech on matters of public concern." 145 There likely are 
scenarios however, where an issue relating to the school 
becomes a matter of public concern and like any citizen, the 
teacher would be able to comment on the issue in a public 
forum-whether that is a letter-to-the-editor or a more modern 
Facebook approach. That sort of case would be fact sensitive as 
the courts consider the content, form, and context of the 
speech. Since many of the social networking sites have become, 
or are becoming, mainstream, voicing an opinion to an online 
community via Facebook could be akin to voicing an opinion 
through a letter-to-the-editor in the community newspaper and 
would likely pass the public official doctrine if the court ruled 
that the speech was a matter of public concern. 
3. Posting personal comments or photos online 
Administrations preventing teachers from posting photos or 
comments online likely create a significant free speech issue 
because of the discretion that it places on school 
administrations to decide what is appropriate in teachers' 
private, off-the-job, speech. While communities want teacher 
role models for their students, it is legal for teachers to drink, 
go to bars, use profanity, or engage in other adult activities, or 
presumably to talk about those things with their friends. This 
is where online social media brings a new element that was not 
present in the past. Teachers used to hold these conversations 
111. Connick v. Myers, 161 U.S. la8, 149 (198:3). 
145. Tiltti v. Weise, 155 F.3d 596,603 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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with their friends and relatives through the telephone, letters, 
and e-mail. With the mainstreaming of social media, personal 
conversations have become more public and the law has to 
answer whether it will allow school districts to curb this sort of 
teacher speech. For example, can Massachusetts legally 
encourage their superintendents to "periodically conduct 
Internet searches to see if teachers have posted inappropriate 
material on-line"?146 
Under a Pickering approach, teachers who dispute with 
their schools about private posts would likely lose the 
balancing test because posting of personal photos and 
conversations is by definition not a matter of public concern. In 
Snyder v. Millersville University, the district court upheld the 
dismissal of a student teacher who had posted a drunken-
pirate photo of herself, engaged in possible insubordinate 
speech against her supervisor, and had inappropriate 
communications with her students. 147 However, it is unclear if 
the court would have upheld the dismissal for just one 
discretion, or if it was a combination of the teacher's online 
behavior that balanced the scale for the university. 148 As 
discussed above, Ginger D'Amico was suspended from her 10-
year teaching job because someone else posted a picture of her 
posing with a male stripper at a bachelorette party. 149 
Therefore, the school punished her because of her legal 
behavior, and not because of her "maturity" to know whether it 
was appropriate to post adult material on Facebook. 150 It is 
difficult to say where a D'Amico case would come out in the 
Pickering model since D'Amico was not the person speaking 
through social media. However, pictures of a wild party likely 
would not be a matter of public concern and thus could be 
regulated. 
Presumably, one of the primary issues with teachers 
posting adult material on the internet is the opportunity that 
students may have to see their teachers implicitly endorsing 
alcohol use or exposing students to sexually explicit material, 
but if teachers are careful to shut out their students from their 
146. Schworm, supra note 10. 
147. Snyder, 2008 WL 509:3140. 
118. Id. 
119. Sostek, supra note 2. 
150. D'Amico was reinstated and settled with her district before the case went to 
trial. 
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web pages, then teachers should be able to have conversations 
with their peers without employers looking over their backs. 
4. Teachers befriending students online 
Prohibiting public school teachers from befriending their 
students online seems like a reasonable policy to protect 
students. 151 Examples such as the three New York teachers, 
who engaged in inappropriate communication with their 
students where they either explicitly endorsed alcohol, made 
sexual comments, or used the electronic interaction to initiate 
real illegal relationships, cause districts to pass electronic 
media polices that can overreach. 152 If teachers want to use 
technology to communicate with students about assignments 
and activities, then they should use school-sponsored web 
pages, profiles, or e-mail so that the administration can 
monitor the communication. Under a Pickering analysis 
teacher-student speech would not be a matter of public concern 
and courts would likely balance in the favor of the schools to 
maintain professional distance so that teachers can responsibly 
carry out their duties. 
B. Student Speech Doctrine 
Under the student-speech doctrine, a school can regulate 
teacher speech if the speech would "substantially interfere 
with ... the operation of the school," and if the school has a 
reasonable pedagogical concern to censor the speech. 153 In some 
ways, the Hazelwood approach seems more appropriate for in-
school or curricular speech. Almost all the cases that have 
applied the Hazelwood analysis involve in-school speech. 
However, the threshold question of whether the speech 
substantially interferes with the operation of a school and 
151. Cyber bullying has become a major issue in recent years with all sorts of 
legislation to protect students' peers from driving them to drastic actions through 
relentless persecution at school and on-line. Presumably this would not he an issue in 
the teacher-student relationship, unless a teacher used his position of power to 
intimidate and harass a disliked student electronically as well as in-dass. But this 
scenario is unlikely as most teachers are more than glad to avoid contact with difficult 
students out-of-dass (unless of course we are assuming a relationship similar to the 
fictional relationship between Professor Snape and Harry Potter). 
152. Chiaramonte & Gonen, supra note 8. 
153. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 481 U.S. 260, 271 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines, 39:l 
u.s. 503, 504 (1969). 
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whether there is a reasonable pedagogical concern to limit the 
speech is a good indicator whether teacher internet speech is 
appropriate. 
1. Comments on political and social issues 
Under the Tinker-Hazelwood approach, teacher online 
speech about political or social issues would likely pass. The 
Court did not allow the school to discipline the students in 
Tinker who used armbands to protest the Vietnam War during 
school; therefore, it is likely that teachers would be able to 
voice their political views out of school without it "substantially 
interrupting the operations of the school." 154 If the community 
is debating a political, social, or educational issue, then a 
teacher could likely make a comment on the issue without 
substantially disrupting the school whether it is through 
Facebook or some other means. 
2. Criticism of school, students, parents, community 
At first, it seems possible that public criticism of the school, 
parents, or community could disrupt the learning atmosphere. 
However, the outcome under a Hazelwood analysis would likely 
depend on the severity and/or frequency of such comments. It is 
unlikely that one ill-advised remark that only a few people 
view-even if it is later discussed in wider circles-could really 
"substantially interrupt the operations of the school." 155 Gossip 
frequently circulates around schools, and while a teacher may 
have negative social backlash for her criticism of the school 
community, it is unreasonable that most of this sort of speech 
would interfere with the learning environment. However, if the 
teacher named a student or supervisor specifically, then the 
comment, depending on its nature, could possibly injure the 
learning or working environment for the particular student or 
employee and others. If the teacher criticizes internal 
administration decisions or policies of the school to such a point 
that it rises to insubordination or spreads discord among the 
faculty, then it would be reasonable that the speech could cause 
substantial harm to the learning environment and the teacher 
could be disciplined because of a pedagogical concern. 
154. Tinker, il9il U.S. at 504. 
155. !d. 
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3. Posting personal comments or photos online 
If students have access to teacher websites that even 
implicitly endorse alcohol use or contain sexually explicit 
material, then it is likely that a teacher could come under fire 
in a student-speech analysis of teacher speech. In Bethel v. 
Fraser, 156 the Court upheld discipline for a student who used 
sexual innuendos in a high school assembly speech, and in 
Morse u. Frederick, 157 the Court upheld a school suspension for 
a student who endorsed drugs. It did not matter that the 
speech would be protected in an adult setting. The Court 
simply found that it was reasonable to protect a captive and 
minor audience from speech that disrupted the civic instruction 
of the curriculum. 158 Similarly, in Lacks v. Ferguson, 159 the 
Eighth Circuit found that the school had a reasonable 
pedagogical reason to discipline a teacher who allowed 
profanity in the classroom, and as mentioned above, the First 
Circuit allowed a district to discipline a teacher for merely 
picking up a student paper from the floor that was entitled 
"Application for a Piece of Ass" and handing it to another 
student as an example of inappropriate language. 160 The main 
difference between the above examples and teacher Internet 
speech is that one occurs on-campus in front of a captive 
audience, while the other is off-the-job speech where a person is 
free to browse or turn away from the material. However, a 
court could rule that student access to teacher websites that 
contain sexually explicit material or even innuendos such as in 
the Hazelwood case could substantially interrupt the 
operations of the school and therefore should be regulated. If 
students do not have access to the material however, then 
there would be no reason for it to interrupt the school or give a 
pedagogical reason to limit the speech. 
4. Befriending students online 
Student-teacher online social networking would likely fail 
under a student speech doctrine because it has huge potential 
to create interruptions at the school as teachers lose the 
156. 178 U.S. 675 (1986). 
157. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
158. Id. 
159. 151 F.3d 904 (1998). 
160. Conward v. Cambridge Sch., 171 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1999). 
2] TEACHER F ACEBOOK SPEECH 663 
professional distance between themselves and their students. It 
is easy to see pedagogical concerns limiting electronic teacher-
student speech because electronic relationships could be the 
first step that lead to illegal teacher-student interaction. In 
Miles v. Denver Public Schools, 161 the Tenth Circuit held that a 
district appropriately disciplined a teacher for commenting in-
class about certain students' romantic lives because it was 
connected to a reasonable pedagogical concern. It is likely that 
teachers who inappropriately comment on their students' social 
lives via the Internet would also cause substantial interruption 
to the school environment and the school would have a 
reasonable pedagogical concern to regulate it. 
C. Which Doctrine Should Courts Apply to Teacher Internet 
Speech? 
First, school administrations should ban student-teacher 
conversations via Facebook or other social networking websites 
unless it occurs through school sponsored pages or methods 
that can be monitored. Professional distance between teachers 
and students is healthy and Facebook and MySpace are not 
professional forums; rather they are social electronic 
gatherings with opportunity for abuse by an unethical 
educator. Therefore, students and teachers should not befriend 
each other on Facebook and students should not have access to 
their teachers' social websites, which could contain 
inappropriate material for minors when teachers are 
interacting with their adult friends. Both the Pickering and 
Hazelwood doctrines likely would allow school districts to 
prohibit student-teacher speech via social network sites 
because the speech is not a matter of public concern and likely 
could be disruptive. 
Without the possibility of minors accessing their teachers' 
private pictures and comments, the most speech protective 
doctrine should apply to teacher internet speech. The 
government should not scrutinize teacher Internet speech more 
strictly than it would with its other employees who do not work 
with students. Teachers should have liberal reign to post 
whatever personal comments or pictures they wish to their 
adult friends even if it would be inappropriate for minors. If 
161. 91-1 F.2d 77:l (1991). 
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students cannot access their teachers' websites, 
superintendents should not be encouraged, nor would they 
have reason to police their employees' online activity. 
Between the Pickering and Hazelwood doctrines, the 
Hazelwood doctrine would likely protect more teacher internet 
speech, while also protecting schoolchildren. Under a 
Hazelwood approach, teacher internet speech would be 
unprotected only if it interferes with the learning environment 
and therefore gives schools a reasonable pedagogical concern to 
regulate it. If students cannot access the websites, teachers 
could be free to post their personal pictures and profiles 
without concern for disruption. Teachers would have the 
freedom to make political speeches and even criticize the school 
as long as the speech was not so extreme or so frequent that it 
interfered with the operation of the school-meaning the 
ability of students to learn and teachers to teach. One colorful 
comment about the school by a frustrated teacher seems 
unlikely to interfere with school operations. 
While the Pickering approach would also work to protect 
against teacher-student online interaction via social network 
sites and protect online political speech, it would be less 
protective when teachers post criticisms of the school or post 
personal comments and photos. The Pickering approach gives 
school districts substantial discretion in deciding what kind of 
speech is appropriate. Most speech on social networking sites is 
not a matter of public concern, and therefore would fail the 
Pickering analysis. Schools should not be able to discipline 
teachers for photos or comments that they display to their 
adult friends and schools should certainly not be searching for 
such material. Teachers, like their private-employee 
counterparts should face consequences for ill-advised, 
potentially public remarks that are so extreme that it 
interferes with work relationships or the work environment, 
but the Hazelwood student-speech analysis would regulate that 
kind of speech if were truly disruptive, while still permitting 
teachers to make unrelated employment posts without fear of 
retribution. 
The question remains how to treat teacher online speech to 
which students gain access because the teacher accidentally 
had settings set to public or where students view pictures of 
their teachers in adult settings because another person besides 
the teacher made them available for public viewing. School 
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administrators should instruct and train their employees about 
social networking sites and the dangers of allowing student 
access. Clear guidelines should be established notifying 
teachers that they should not purposefully befriend students 
and settings should be set to private. As long as fair warning is 
given, administrators who want to take a hard-line stance on 
student-teacher interaction via social networking, even if it is 
only accidental, likely would be supported by both the 
Pickering and Hazelwood approaches. While it may seem 
harsh, strictly prohibiting students from viewing teacher social 
networking web pages should allow teachers more freedom to 
communicate with their friends without the worry of minors for 
whom they are responsible viewing inappropriate material and 
interrupting the school or work environment. Finally, teachers 
should not be held responsible for pictures or comments that 
are made about them outside of their control, as long as the 
teacher is not the speaker and it depicts the teacher 
participating in legal activity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regulation of teacher internet speech creates First 
Amendment concerns that usually do not exist in the normal 
teacher in-school speech analysis. Internet speech is a private 
activity where teachers, like others, post personal material. 
Students and teachers should be prohibited from interacting 
with each other or having access to one another's social 
networking web pages to both protect the student and to 
protect the teacher's ability to speak freely on legal, adult, 
subjects. When students are eliminated from the scene, 
teachers should be given broad internet free speech rights. 
Although almost counterintuitive, the Hazelwood student-
speech approach would likely give teachers more speech rights 
on the internet because schools could only discipline the 
teacher speech if it amounted to a substantial disruption of the 
school that the school had a pedagogical reason to regulate. 
Without students in the mix, the speech would have to be 
extremely critical of the school before it would actually disrupt 
the work environment. 
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